MINUTE entry before the Honorable Lindsay C. Jenkins: The motion for a temporary restraining order, expedited discovery and for electronic service [16] is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted to the extent that Plaintiff may pursue expedited discovery and serve Defendant electronically. It is denied as to a temporary restraining order without prejudice to renewal. According to the memorandum, personal jurisdiction over Defendant Ostoo is proper because Oosto "directly targets business activities toward consumers in the United States, including Illinois, by directly offering for sale products into this judicial district as well as through at least the fully interactive, commercial Defendant Internet Store" [Dkt. 16-1 at 9.] The court doubts this is sufficient to establish jurisdiction, at least without more information. Rubik's Brand, Ltd. v. The Partnerships, 2021 WL 825668, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2021) (no personal jurisdiction over a defendant where only connection to the forum was operating an online marketplace that had "the possibility" of shipping to Illinois). Second, temporary restraining orders are extraordinary and drastic remedies that "should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The party seeking such relief must show: (1) it has some likelihood of success on the merits; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; and (3) it will suffer irreparable harm if the court denies relief. GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield, 922 F.3d 357, 364 (7th Cir. 2019). If each of those factors is met, the Court, employing a sliding scale approach, first weighs the harm the plaintiff will suffer absent an injunction against the harm to the defendant from an injunction, and next considers whether an injunction is in the public interest. Here, Plaintiff's memorandum in support of a TRO does not refer to Defendant Oosto specifically or by name even once in its 16-page motion. The closest reference to Oosto appears to be that "Defendant internet store has been identified and linked to numerous marketplace listings" and that "Defendant has a total of twelve active listings on its storefront, one of which is the listing for the Infringing Products at issue in this case." [Dkt. 16-1 at 7, 16.] In short, the filing makes generic arguments without any specifics to Oosto in particular. "[G]eneric facts alleged in Schedule A cases cannot satisfy Rule 65(b)." Eicher v. The Partnerships, 2025 WL 2299593, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2025). It is "all but impossible for the Court to discern the likelihood of success from the one-sided evidence provided" and "it is nearly impossible to resolve whether defendant [is] engaged in [unlawful conduct] on such a sparse record," particularly absent adversarial briefing. Id. As for irreparable harm, it is true that damage to a copyright holder's goodwill can constitute irreparable injury for which the owner has no adequate legal remedy and that as a result irreparable harm is generally presumed. Re/Max N. Cent., Inc. v. Cook, 272 F.3d 424, 432 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussed in trademark context). But since generic facts cannot satisfy Rule 65(b), Schedule A plaintiffs should not be entitled to such presumptions. Even assuming that the likelihood of success, irreparable harm, and adequate remedy at law factors are met, the court is not persuaded that the Schedule A mechanism satisfies the balance of interests inquiry, or even that the court can properly weigh the interests at stake without Defendant's presence in the case. Nor will the public interest be served by an ex parte ruling. To satisfy interest balancing, the "injunction must do more good than harm (which is to say that the 'balance of equities' favors the plaintiff)." Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009). For the reasons explained in Eicher, Schedule A cases may be more likely to harm the public interest than to favor it. Should Plaintiff renew its request for injunctive relief, the court will review that request with these considerations in mind. Any request for a prejudgment asset restraint, however, is not well taken because such restraints are not to be used to secure assets for collection. Plaintiff seeks disgorgement, which is an equitable remedy the court can impose where the defendant "actually holds property or proceeds that belong to the plaintiff which can be returned to the plaintiff." See Cont'l Vineyard LLC v. Dzierzawski, 2018 WL 11195945, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2018). Even in the typical disgorgement of profits scenario, courts are not obligated to impose a prejudgment asset restraint. The decision to do so is discretionary. See Roadget Bus. Pte. Ltd. v. Schedule A Hereto, 735 F. Supp. 3d 981, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2024) ("[W]here a plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy like disgorgement, an asset freeze may be appropriate.") Here, the court declines to exercise its discretion in the broad manner requested, particularly considering that imposing a prejudgment asset restraint is likely to encompasses legitimate assets. An asset restraint is not necessary to conduct an accounting; discovery and records of sales can provide any accounting plaintiff may be entitled to. Schedule A plaintiffs rarely pursue an actual accounting as a remedy and rarely justify requests for statutory damages by reference to actual sales figures, lost profits, or the like. Instead, counsel typically ask for statutory damages based on notions of deterrence without case-specific factual support justifying the number. Plaintiff shall submit a proposed order for expedited discovery and for electronic service to the court's PO Bix by October 28, 2025. Mailed notice.
16
10/23/2025
MOTION by Plaintiff Unicolors, Inc. to seal
15
10/16/2025
SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Unicolors, Inc. -- Second Amended Complaint
14
10/09/2025
MINUTE entry before the Honorable Lindsay C. Jenkins: The court has reviewed the plaintiff's memorandum on joinder [Dkt. 10] but Plaintiff has failed to satisfy its burden to show that joinder of more than 50 defendants is proper in this matter under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2). See Este Lauder Cosms. Ltd. v. The Partnerships, 334 F.R.D. 182, 185 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (noting that "[plaintiff] bears the burden of demonstrating that joinder is proper"). In evaluating the appropriateness of joinder, the court assesses whether a logical relationship exists between defendants through actual evidentiary overlap, not coincidence. Este Lauder, 334 F.R.D. at 185. Plaintiff argues that joinder is proper because the joined Defendants use non-descript seller aliases, use many of the same or similar photographs to market and promote the same kind of counterfeit garments, all operate on Amazon and Walmart, and use the same illegitimate search engine optimization. These similarities, Plaintiff says, "are not a coincidence, but rather the result of Defendants being a part of the same series of transactions and occurrences infringing Unicolors' rights." [Dkt. 10 at 7.] These statements are "highly generic and could apply equally to individuals and entities engaging in activities that are wholly unrelated to this suit." Art Ask Agency v. The Partnerships, No. 21-CV-06197, 2021 WL 5493226, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2021). Nor are Defendants or their alleged infringement "interrelated" simply because Defendants sell similar products. Id. (rejecting joinder based on features such as shopping platforms, illegitimate SEO tactics, and the use of the same text and images, among other arguments). In short, the court is not persuaded that any one defendant's alleged trademark infringement is linked to the next defendant's infringement sufficient to show they are part of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as required by Rule 20. Even if the court were mistaken in its joinder analysis, it exercises its discretion to not permit joinder in this case. See Dorsey v. Varga, 55 F.4th 1094, 110204 (7th Cir. 2022). Joining this many defendants in one case simply will not promote judicial economy. See Este Lauder, 334 F.R.D. at 189 ("[P]resenting dozens or hundreds of defendants in one lawsuit actually undermines judicial economy, because this Court must evaluate the evidence submitted in support of liability and, eventually, damages. That is especially true in the ex parte setting of a temporary restraining order, as well as for default-judgment motions."); Art Ask Agency, 2021 WL 5493226, at *3 (rejecting joinder of 216 defendants, noting that "joinder in this case may yield significant financial benefits to [the plaintiff] at the judiciary's expense.") Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint listing one Defendant by no later than October 16, 2025. Any motion for electronic service of process order should also be submitted by October 16, 2025. Mailed notice.
13
10/08/2025
RESPONSE by Plaintiff Unicolors, Inc. to mailed 6
12
10/08/2025
MEMORANDUM by Unicolors, Inc. -- Supplemental Memorandum Establishing Joinder is Proper and Request for Leave to Conduct Expedited Limited Discovery
11
10/02/2025
MINUTE entry before the Honorable Lindsay C. Jenkins: Upon review of the complaint, the Court sua sponte raises the propriety of joining more than 50 defendants in a single action. By October 8, 2025, plaintiff must file a supplemental memorandum addressing the propriety of joinder. In the alternative, plaintiff has leave to file an amended complaint by October 8, 2025 with a smaller subset of defendants along with a memorandum explaining why that smaller subset of defendants is properly joined. No motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order should be filed in this matter without counsel first consulting the opinion issued in Wham-O Holding v. The Partnerships, 24 CV 12523, Dkt. 39 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2025) (Alexakis, J.). Mailed notice.
10
10/01/2025
CLERK'S NOTICE: Pursuant to Local Rule 73.1(b), a United States Magistrate Judge of this court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action. If all parties consent to have the currently assigned United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case, including trial, the entry of final judgment, and all post-trial proceedings, all parties must sign their names on the attached Consent To form. This consent form is eligible for filing only if executed by all parties. The parties can also express their consent to jurisdiction by a magistrate judge in any joint filing, including the Joint Initial Status Report or proposed Case Management Order.
9
10/01/2025
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Lindsay C. Jenkins. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable M. David Weisman. Case assignment: Random assignment. (Civil Category Three).
8
09/30/2025
SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Unicolors, Inc. -- (Unredacted) Amended Complaint
7
09/30/2025
AMENDED complaint by Unicolors, Inc. against The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified in Schedule A
6
09/29/2025
MAILED Copyright Request Letter to Plaintiff's counsel Trevor William Barrett. (bi,)
5
09/26/2025
NOTIFICATION of Affiliates pursuant to Local Rule 3.2 by Unicolors, Inc.
4
09/26/2025
ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Unicolors, Inc. by Trevor William Barrett
3
09/26/2025
CIVIL Cover Sheet
2
09/26/2025
SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Unicolors, Inc. -- (Unredacted) Complaint
1
09/26/2025
COMPLAINT filed by Unicolors, Inc.; Jury Demand. Filing fee $ 405, receipt number AILNDC-24121554.
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2025-11-07 15:38:47
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